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Abstract 
Skills and skill mismatches are claimed to have major consequences for societies and individuals, 
although convincing evidence mainly exists for wages. Our article examines the association 
between skill mismatch and job satisfaction as well as other social outcomes, such as political 
efficacy and social trust. Drawing on data from the OECD Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), we contribute to sociological research by applying 
the ‘effective skill’ concept, a new conceptual approach to measure skill mismatch. We relate this 
new concept to job satisfaction and other social outcomes, comparing our results with alternative 
skill mismatch indicators. Our findings provide empirical evidence for two important messages: 
First, we provide evidence that once we use objective indicators for the skill match – and we 
make use of all measures that we currently have – there is no association between skill mismatch 
and job satisfaction. In fact, job satisfaction is driven by skill use, not by skill mismatches or skill 
proficiency. Second, we show that effective skill and skill mismatch are associated with other 
social outcomes, having quite considerable effects especially on political efficacy.  
Keywords: Skill Mismatch, Effective skill, Overskilling, Job Satisfaction, Social Outcomes 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Jim Allen (ROA, Maastricht University), Jan Heisig 
(WZB, Berlin), Davey Poulissen and Maria Ferreira (ROA), and the participants of the 4th 
International PIAAC conference (November 2017, Singapore) for valuable comments and 
suggestions. 
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1. Introduction 
Job-worker mismatches are claimed to be a pervasive and persistent phenomenon (Green, 2013; 
Cedefop, 2018). The significance of the literature on skill mismatch and overqualification is 
driven by the fact that the mass participation in higher education has changed the workforce of 
industrialised societies. The most important mechanism of adjustment of labour markets to the 
oversupply of highly educated workers is overqualification (Büchel, de Grip, and Mertens, 2003: 
9). Given that, it does not come as a surprise that the proportion of mismatched workers has 
increased over time (Verhaest and Van der Velden, 2013). Evidence suggests that the 
consequences may be increasing as well (Green and Zhu, 2010), particularly if employees get 
trapped in a job for which they are overeducated (Voßemer and Schuck, 2016). Although skill 
mismatch, and especially overskilling, is claimed to have major consequences for societies and 
individuals, convincing evidence mainly exists for wages (see e.g. Allen and Van der Velden, 
2001; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2015; Heyes, Tomlinson, and Whitworth, 2017). However, if 
employees are in a situation in which their jobs require more (or fewer) skills than they can 
provide, it is not all about money. There are strong indications that skill mismatches, and 
particularly overskilling, might have a negative effect on job satisfaction as well (e.g. Allen and 
van der Velden, 2001; Allen, Levels, and van der Velden, 2013; Verhaest and Verhofstadt, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence for this is based on subjective indicators of the skill match 
and this has not been backed up yet by research based on objective indicators of skill mismatch. 
When it comes to other social outcomes of skill mismatch, a deeper examination is largely 
missing in the discourse (Green and Henseke, 2016). 
The political and academic interest in skills and mismatches merely rests upon the concern that 
skills are not only important for the individual well-being, but vital for the proper functioning of 
labour markets, democracies, and societies as a whole (European Commission, 2016). Skills and 
mismatches are thereby considered to have a broad impact, also affecting aspects of private and 
social life outside work (OECD, 2017; Desjardins and Schuller, 2006). To capture the full impact 
of skills and skill mismatches, we must consider potential social outcomes in addition to 
economic consequences (see Freeman, 1976; McMahon, 2009; Green and Henseke, 2016). Job 
satisfaction, as a subjective and work related indicator, is one of such outcomes. But other 
indicators like social trust or political efficacy are relevant as well. Job satisfaction is one of the 
key determinants of general well-being, and thus bridges the worlds of work and society. Trust 
and efficacy have externalities that spill over to benefit other people, contributing to social 
cohesion and hence social capital (McMahon, 2009: 223; Schleicher and Thorn, 2016; European 
Commission, 2016). A key dimension of the social capital of a society is social trust, concerning 
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interpersonal trust and generalised trust in others. Political trust and the perception of the 
individual political efficacy form a vital part of political capital, a key pillar of each democracy 
(Schleicher, Thorn, 2016: 8). Social trust and the perception of the own (political) efficacy are 
related to skills and education as both require individuals to have the cognitive and analytical 
competency that is needed to “develop, maintain, and (perhaps) restore” trust, allowing people e.g. to 
appreciate co-operation with others in all kinds of settings (see Borgonovi and Burns, 2015: 10).  
Although skills are thus related to both economic and social outcomes, skill mismatch (i.e. skills 
shortage or surplus) must also have an effect. This is the reason why not only the interest in skills 
but also concerns about skill mismatches are growing both in politics and academia (European 
Commission, 2016). In his seminal article on overeducation, Peter Sloane raised the question 
about social outcomes, asking: Is overeducation “Much Ado About Nothing?” (Sloane, 2003). At 
the time, however, good mismatch indicators were lacking, and the empirical evidence was mainly 
based on workers´ self-assessment of the skill match. To date, the OECD Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) provides detailed information on the 
actual skills of workers, giving new and better opportunities for the investigation of returns to 
skills and the development of mismatch indicators that are based on objective rather than 
subjective data. Nevertheless, skill mismatch still poses challenges to sociological research and 
related academic disciplines, as no consensus exists on how to capture the phenomenon and 
what constitutes an adequate indicator.  
The objective of our paper is twofold: First, building on the discussion that skills have a broader 
impact, we dig deeper into the relation between skills, skill mismatches and social outcomes. 
Making use of the unprecedented possibilities provided by PIAAC data in an explorative way, we 
shed new light on how skill mismatches might affect job satisfaction, and furthermore examine 
other social outcomes, such as political efficacy and social trust. Second, we contribute to 
sociological research by applying a new approach to measure skill mismatch: the ‘effective skill’ 
concept, developed by Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018). This concept is based on a theoretical 
re-thinking of the relation between skill proficiency and skill use. The authors integrate both into 
a new concept: ‘effective skill’, defined as the multiplicative function of skill proficiency and skill 
use. The intuitive understanding is that skills can have no effect if they are not put to productive 
use – and, vice versa, using skills can only have a small effect if proficiency is low. So far, the 
concept has only been tested on wages, where it performed superior to alternative approaches 
(Van der Velden and Bijlsma, 2018). In our article, we relate the effective skill concept to job 
satisfaction and other social outcomes, comparing our empirical findings with alternative 
indicators, developed by Allen, Levels, and Van der Velden (2013) and Pellizzari and Fichen 
4 
 
(2013). Using PIAAC data, our article relies on objective skills measurements for male fulltime 
employees in 22 industrialised countries. 
Adapting the new effective skill concept to address social outcomes, we present an illuminating 
new way of thinking about the phenomenon of skill mismatches. We provide evidence for two 
important messages: First, we show that there is no relation between skill mismatch and job 
satisfaction once we use objective measures for the skill match. We show that the relation 
between skill mismatch and job satisfaction is entirely driven by skill use: People who use their 
skills more, are more likely to be satisfied with their job. Once we control for this, there is no 
additional effect of skill mismatch. Second, we show that not only skills, but also skill mismatches 
are related to other social outcomes, such as political efficacy and social trust.  
The article begins with a brief review of the state of the art concerning skill mismatch and related 
consequences. After that, we describe our dataset and analytical methods. We then investigate 
social outcomes of effective skill and over- and underperformance in effective skill before we 
conclude with a discussion of our results. 
2. Skill mismatch and social outcomes  
Skill mismatch, in its vertical dimension, refers to a working situation in which the skills 
possessed by a worker do not meet or exceed the skill requirements of his or her workplace. For 
example, we define a worker as overskilled if he or she has more skills than required by the 
workplace, hence the worker does not have the chance to fully exploit his or her talents. 
Underskilled workers, by contrast, have fewer skills than required by their jobs. Against the 
background of rising demands for specific skills in the knowledge economy, skills are “widely 
regarded as a core object for policy interventions and analytical research” (Green, Felstead, 
Gallie, and Inanc, 2013: 9). There is a common belief that by promoting skills and improving the 
respective policies, governments and other collective agents can enhance both economic 
prosperity and social cohesion (see Green et al., 2013: 4; McMahon, 2009; European 
Commission, 2016).  
There has been a large amount of research on skill mismatches and their impact during the past 
decades. Usually, the literature focuses on wages. Several studies show that wage returns to excess 
skills are less than returns to required skills (e.g. Hartog, 2000; Perry et al., 2014; Hanushek et al., 
2015; Van der Velden and Bijlsma, 2018). Previous studies also addressed job satisfaction and 
mental well-being, finding that both are lower for overeducated employees (e.g. Allen and Van 
der Velden, 2001; Green and Zhu, 2010; Allen, Levels, and Van der Velden, 2013; Verhaest and 
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Verhofstadt, 2016; Green and Henseke, 2016; Heyes, Tomlinson, and Witworth, 2017). Given 
the lack of data on skills before the PIAAC survey was conducted, earlier studies are merely 
based on measures that capture the self-reported perception of the skill match. Still, we would 
also expect that skill mismatches based on objective indicators would have an impact on job 
satisfaction. We expect that job satisfaction is positively related to requirements in the job as 
challenging jobs may increase job satisfaction (Van der Velden and Verhaest, 2017). And that any 
surplus of skills will negatively impact job satisfaction. The reason is that workers will compare 
themselves either with workers in the same job that deploy a lower level of effective skill or 
compare themselves with workers in jobs that require the same higher level of effective skill. In 
both cases, they will find themselves in a situation that is disadvantageous, leading to lower levels 
of job satisfaction.1 The relation of the reverse situation of underperformance to job satisfaction 
is less clear. On one hand, a small skill shortage may be positive for the worker as it makes the 
job more challenging. On the other hand, if the shortage is too big, it may lead to stress and 
therefore less job satisfaction (Van der Velden and Verhaest, 2017). We therefore refrain from 
formulating a specific hypothesis on the effect of underperformance.  
The perception of individuals of exerting influence on political issues as well as having trust in 
other people, is deeply rooted in individual experiences and based on cognitive and analytical 
capacities that are needed to develop and maintain both trust and an adequate perception of the 
own efficacy (see Borgonovi and Burns, 2015). A high skill proficiency level combined with the 
experience of task-related efficacy at work due to a productive use of one´s skills, may serve as an 
empowering combination, increasing both engagement and effort in other domains of life 
(Bandura, 1977). People who feel that they are in control of their work, may also feel more 
efficacious when it comes to political processes. We would also expect a positive relation with 
social trust, which is known to be related to skill proficiency and education, but which may also 
be underpinned by the experience caused by an efficacious exploitation of one´s own skills and 
talents. We would expect that skill mismatches are also related to these social outcomes, in the 
same way as they would affect wages. 
Evidence suggests that the association between mismatches and wages are best explained by 
matching models, assuming that the combination of supply and demand determines outcomes 
(Duncan and Hoffman, 1981). In the so-called Overeducation–Required education–
Undereducation model (ORU model), Duncan and Hoffman (1981) break down the individual 
                                               
1 Note that this is different than in the case of wages where overskilled workers still have a positive pay-
off.  
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educational attainment into three components (years of required education for the job, years of 
overeducation, and years of undereducation), providing evidence of economic effects of 
educational mismatches. While required education yields the largest wage premium, economic 
returns to years of overeducation are smaller, though positive and significant. By contrast, years 
of undereducation result in wage penalties. These results have been replicated in many studies all 
over the world (Hartog, 2000; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000). Years of education 
required on the job thereby serve as crucial control proxying job requirements. 
Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018) use the ORU logic to develop the effective skill concept, 
identifying three underlying components of effective skill: the typically required effective skill in 
an occupation, and the individual overperformance or underperformance. “Overperformance” 
refers to a situation in which the effective skill deployed by a worker is considerably higher than 
the effective skill required by the job, whereas “underperformance” is defined as the opposite. 
Using the new concept to develop an ‘effective skill matching model’, Van der Velden and 
Bijlsma examine the effects of required effective skill and effective skill mismatches on wages, 
showing a strong association between effective skill and wages. Furthermore, the authors show 
that the concept of effective skill is theoretically and empirically sound and the associated skill 
mismatch model superior to alternative models (Van der Velden and Bijlsma, 2018: 23). In the 
article at hand, we extend the analyses by Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018) to include job 
satisfaction and other social outcomes. We apply the same logic of the classical Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981) ORU model. If returns to skills are flexible, and if social outcomes such as job 
satisfaction, political efficacy, and social trust are related to both job requirements in terms of 
effective skill as well any mismatch between those requirements and the effective skill a worker 
actually deploys, we would expect to find support for the following hypotheses: 
H 1.  Required effective skills are positively related to job satisfaction, political efficacy and social 
 trust.  
H 2.  Overperformance is negatively related to job satisfaction.  
H 3.  Overperformance is positively related to political efficacy and social trust as additional 
 effective  skills pay off, whereas the relation between underperformance and these outcomes  is 
 negative.  
3. Data and methods 
To empirically test the theoretical notions outlined above, we use the PIAAC data (see OECD, 
2013, 2016). In this survey, adults aged 16-65 have been tested in key skills related to information 
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processing at work and in daily life (literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving in technology-rich 
environments). We use data for the 22 countries that participated in PIAAC Round I (2011-12), 
excluding Russia and Australia due to issues regarding data reliability and data protection 
legislation. From the Canadian sample, we take a random sample of about 20 percent to avoid 
overrepresentation in the dataset. We restrict our analyses to male employees because labour 
market engagement, especially of older generations, is different for women. Moreover, the 
mechanisms that drive job satisfaction and the other outcomes under study may also be different 
for men and women. We exclude part-time workers because the indicators in PIAAC assessing 
the frequency of skill use are more adequately designed for fulltime workers. We also exclude 
self-employed, members of the armed forces, unpaid family workers and students/interns. Our 
analyses rely on representative samples of male fulltime working employees in 22 industrial 
countries based on micro data for 30,387 respondents. We focus on the skill domain of 
numeracy. As a robustness check, we also compute our basic models using literacy to analyse 
whether our results are consistent over different skill domains.  
As the PIAAC survey covers all jobs in a large number of countries, a direct objective measure of 
skill matching based on a systematic evaluation of job requirements does not exist. Various 
approaches have been developed to proxy skill requirements (for details see Hartog, 2000; Van 
der Velden and Bijlsma, 2018). To operationalise skill mismatch, we make use of the new 
‘effective skill’ concept developed by Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018). The authors define 
effective skill as the multiplicative function of skill proficiency and skill use. Firmly based on 
efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977) and use-it-or-lose-it theories (Salthouse, 2006), the concept 
provides an explicit mechanism for relating skills to productivity and performance.  
Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018) have developed a matching model for effective skill, 
following the logic of the ORU model and a so-called realised matches (RM) approach (Hartog, 
2000). The RM approach assumes that every occupation has a unique required level of effective 
skill, defined as the average effective skill level in that occupation2. If the effective skill of a 
certain worker lies more than 0.5 standard deviation above the required level in that occupation, 
the person is classified as overperforming. If a worker’s effective skill lies more than 0.5 standard 
deviation below the required level, this person is classified as working below the required 
effective skill level (underperforming).  
                                               
2 To estimate the robust average skill proficiency levels for country-specific ISCO 2-digit occupation 
categories, we resort to the calculations performed by Allen and Bijlsma (2015). In their paper, Van der 
Velden and Bijlsma (2018) show that the total explained variance does not change if they use 3-digit 
instead of 2-digit ISCO categories.  
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In PIAAC, skill use is assessed on the basis of an indicator that rates the frequency of skill use at 
the workplace with a six-item battery (each of the items conveys a 5-point scale, ranging from 
“never” to “every day”). Following Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018), we compute a simple 
average of the six items indicating the use of numeracy skills at work. For the proficiency scores, 
we use the average of the ten plausible values (PVs) for each skill domain that are drawn from the 
proficiency distribution and provided in the PIAAC dataset (OECD, 2013, 2016). We leave out 
the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution to avoid outliers. As a robustness check, we compute 
the results for several separate PVs to see whether they produce the same results, which is indeed 
the case (see Tables A4a-c in the online supplement Appendix A). 
We dichotomise all our dependent variables in order to ensure comparability between our 
models. The first outcome under study - job satisfaction - is not normally distributed, which is why 
we cannot use the metric scale. Besides, factors that make worker satisfied may differ from those 
that make workers dissatisfied. We therefore predict satisfaction as opposed to no satisfaction. In 
PIAAC, the original variable that captures political efficacy is based on a 5-point scale ranging from 
“disagreement” to “agreement” with the statement “People like me don’t have any say about 
what the government does”. The category “neither agree nor disagree” does not seem to 
represent the indifferent middle in a continuum but rather must be interpreted as “don’t know”. 
We dichotomise the variable, predicting disagreement with the statement vs. the rest. Social trust is 
based on the sum score of two five-level Likert items on the perception of general 
trustworthiness of people. We dichotomise this variable, distinguishing between high social trust 
(sum scores>5) and low social trust (sum scores<=5). For sample statistics, see Table 1. 
Our dataset contains individuals nested in sampling clusters (characterised by a specific weighting 
procedure) nested in countries. To properly take into account country-level errors, we estimate 
multilevel mixed-effects logit regression models (using the melogit command in Stata 14). 
Computing multilevel models, we cannot make use of the replicate weights that are implemented 
in PIAAC. All analyses are therefore weighted using a ‘rescaling to cluster size’ approach with 
which we adjust the overall sample weight to account for different sizes of the country samples. 
We assign a random effect on the cluster level as well as on the country level (for detailed 
information about the dataset and technical issues, see OECD, 2013 and 2016). We conduct 
deviance tests to evaluate the correct fit of our statistical models. The difference in deviance 
between nested models fitted to the same dataset can be used as test statistics having a chi-
squared distribution with the number of added parameters indicating the degrees of freedom 
(Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97). Our empirical strategy follows Van der Velden and Bijlsma 
(2018). We first conduct some interim analyses, testing the effective skill assumption by 
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comparing models in which we take up skill proficiency and skill use as separate variables to 
models in which we additionally include the effective skill interaction term that represents the 
multiplicative function of skill proficiency and skill use (for results, see Table A1 in the online 
Appendix A). We also run quantile regressions to assess whether the effect of skill use is the same 
over the entire skills distribution and the other way around (Figures 1-3).  
In our main analyses, we estimate matching models to investigate the relation between effective 
skill and social outcomes based on the following formula: 
Yic = αc + β1RESic + β2OESic + β3UESic + β4Cic + υic + ωic  
or  
Yic = αc + β1ESMic + β2Cic + υic + ωic     (eq. 1) 
where Yic is the outcome under study of individual i in country c; αc is the country-specific 
constant; ESMic is a vector of the three effective skill match variables: Required Effective Skill 
RESic, Overperformance in Effective Skill OESic, and Underperformance in Effective Skill UESic; 
Cic is a vector of control variables (containing age and age squared)
3. The idiosyncratic error term 
at the individual level is represented by υic whereas ωic refers to the country-level error term. 
We compare the effective skill matching model with alternative skill mismatch models as 
suggested by Allen, Levels and Van der Velden (2013), and by Pellizzari and Fichen (2013). Allen 
et al. (2013) compare the individual skill use to the individual skill proficiency, capturing the 
relative skill use and the amount of over- and underutilisation of skills. By contrast, Pellizzari and 
Fichen (2013) assess the range of skill proficiency of all workers who identify themselves as well-
matched. Every respondent with a skill proficiency level above 95% of the proficiency range of 
the well-matched, is defined as overskilled, whereas every respondent below the 5% level is 
considered as underskilled (Pellizzari and Fichen, 2013). In addition to these alternative 
(objective) skill mismatch approaches, we include the subjective skill mismatch measure that is 
implemented in PIAAC.  
We follow the classical ORU model approach by Duncan and Hoffman (1981). This model 
distinguishes three separate components: number of years of required education, number of years 
of overeducation, and number of years of undereducation. Following this approach, we turn all 
models into standard matching models containing these three components. The effective skill 
                                               
3 Controlling for age and age squared, we make sure that the natural driven effect of the cognitive decline 
in skills does not bias our findings. We do not include other controls to avoid over-controlling. 
Particularly, we do not control for the level of education as this is highly correlated with skills itself. 
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matching model contains all three components. As the approaches by Allen et al. (2013) and 
Pellizzari/Fichen (2013) only identify underutilisation/overskilling and 
overutilisation/underskilling, we have to complement these models with a component that 
indicates job requirements. Using PIAAC data, the best proxy for skill requirements that we have 
is skill use. We therefore control for skill use to proxy skill requirements of jobs. For these 
alternative models based on Allen et al. (2013) and Pellizzari/Fichen (2013), we estimate the 
following equation, using the respective mismatch indicators. 
Yic = αc + β1SUic + β2OSic + β3USic + β4Cic + υic + ωic   (eq. 2) 
where SUic is the individual skill use score, and OSic, and USic indicate overskilling and 
underskilling respectively.  
As outlined above, we also compare our results with the subjective skill mismatch measure in 
PIAAC that is based on a direct self-assessment. We define employees as underskilled if they 
answer ‘yes’ to the question “Do you feel that you need further training in order to cope well 
with your present duties?” and ‘no’ to the question “Do you feel that you have the skills to cope 
with more demanding duties than those you are required to perform in your current job?”. By 
contrast, we define workers as overskilled if they answer the opposite to both questions. 
Following the approach developed by the OECD (2013), self-reported well-matched people are 
respondents who answer “no” to both questions. We use this category as a reference. A large 
number of people reported that they are underskilled as well as overskilled, a combination that is 
not interpretable. We will include this category in our models but will not interpret the results. 
Based on the self-assessment, the category “well-matched” is very small, containing only around 
8 percent of all male full-time employees.4  
Computing logistic multilevel mixed-effects models, we compare the odds of being in one group 
versus the other. To achieve a better comparison of the models, based on the alternative 
mismatch indicators (see Tables 2-4 and A5), we standardise all continuous independent variables 
(i.e. the effective skill variables and skill use) that we use in our statistical models. Only then can 
we directly compare the effect sizes of the different variables in the model. The mismatch 
indicators developed by Allen et al. (2013) and Pellizzari and Fichen (2013) are dummy variables, 
which is why we do not to standardise these variables. 
                                               
4 This is problematic when it comes to giving a good description of the distribution of skill matches and 
mismatches in the different countries. This variable should therefore not be used for descriptive analyses. 
However in our case we are more interested in the effect of subjective overskilling or underskilling. These 
results are probably less biased.  
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4. Findings 
Applying the effective skill matching model, we start our empirical analyses with a test of the 
underlying assumption that the outcome under study is a multiplicative term (see Van der Velden 
and Bijlsma, 2018). We perform quantile regressions to assess whether the association between 
the two components of effective skill, skill proficiency and skill use, and the outcomes under 
study is the same over the entire distribution and the other way around. Figures 1 to 3 are 
graphical representations of the results. Coefficients are obtained using weighted multilevel 
mixed-effects ordered logistic regressions (for further basic analyses, see Table A1 in the online 
appendix).  
[FIGURES 1 to 3 about here] 
For job satisfaction (see Figure 1), the graph shows that skill use has an overall significant and 
positive relation, no matter how proficient a worker is, whereas job satisfaction does not vary 
with skill proficiency. Although the existing literature on the relation between job satisfaction and 
skills does usually not differ between skill proficiency and skill use, this finding is unexpected. 
Using regression analyses, we will test later on if the alternative skill mismatch measures by Allen 
et al. (2013) and Pellizzari/Fichen (2013) give different results. By contrast to job satisfaction, the 
graphs for political efficacy (Figure 2) and social trust (Figure 3) show nearly smooth surfaces, 
clearly displaying a multiplicative effect. Both graphs represent the idea behind the effective skill 
concept, namely that the effects on social outcomes are a multiplicative function of skill 
proficiency and skill use.  
Testing the hypotheses that we outlined before, we now compute matching models to examine 
the relation between skill mismatches, job satisfaction, political efficacy, and social trust as 
dependent variables. All tables display odds ratios. The interpretation is as follows: The number 1 
is the centre of the odd scale. An odds ratio <1 implies that the chances are smaller compared to 
the reference category. An odds ratio >1 stands for a relative increase of chances to belong to the 
outcome group under study. An odds ratio =1 implies no differences in the chances of the two 
groups. For job satisfaction, results are displayed in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 about here] 
Regarding the likelihood ratio test, the effective skill matching model (see model 1 in Table 2) 
performs clearly better than the alternative skill mismatch models 2 and 3. However, given that 
we already know from Figure 1 that the assumption of a multiplicative effect of skill proficiency 
and skill use on job satisfaction does not hold, we have to be cautious with the interpretation of 
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the results. The results indicate that – in line with Hypothesis 1 – there is a relative strong effect of 
the level of required effective skill on job satisfaction: workers in jobs that require more effective 
skill are also more satisfied with their job. An increase in required effective skill of 1 standard 
deviation increases the chances of being satisfied with your job with 29%. However, deploying 
more effective skill than required does not decrease the satisfaction level. For the alternative skill 
mismatch measures developed by Allen et al. (2013) and Pellizzari and Fichen (2013), we find 
positive and significant associations of skill use (as a proxy for required skills) and job 
satisfaction, thus again confirming Hypothesis 1. However we do not find any support for an effect 
of being overskilled, which means that we have to refuse Hypothesis 2. Although we did not 
formulate any specific hypothesis on this, we do find a negative effect of being underskilled in 
the Allen et al. model. However, this relation is only significant at the 5% level.5 
These are important findings. No matter which objective measure we use – the Allen et al. (2013) 
measure, Pellizzari/Fichen (2013) or our own effective skill matching model –, we do not find a 
correlation between being overskilled and job satisfaction6. This is contrary to what has been 
shown before, but that is because these previous findings were based on a subjective measure of 
skill mismatch. If we look at the subjective measure of skill mismatch available in PIAAC (model 
4 in Table 2), we also find the expected negative effect of being overskilled. Moreover, the results 
also indicate a negative effect of being underskilled, although only significant at the 5% level. It 
thus seems that previous results on the relation between overskilling and job satisfaction, are only 
true when we measure skill mismatch in a subjective way. In other words, workers seem to 
become dissatisfied when they think that they can handle more complex jobs. However, on the 
basis of this observation we cannot make any claim about the effect of real skill mismatch based 
on objective indicators. An investigation of real skill (mis)match must always be based on 
objective information about a worker’s real skill proficiency. Drawing on such objective 
measurements as provided by PIAAC, our findings indicate that the claim that earlier studies 
made regarding the negative correlation between overskilling and job satisfaction, is an artefact 
                                               
5 This finding is contrary to the results of the original study by Allen et al. (2013), as the authors found 
that mismatched, and especially underutilised workers are less satisfied. The difference between the article 
at hand and the original study lies in the model specification: Allen et al. control for proficiency, whereas 
we control for skill use, following the classical Duncan and Hoffman (1981) specification. We also 
computed the model controlling for skill proficiency instead of skill use, and obtained the same negative 
effect of skill mismatches on job satisfaction that Allen et al. found. The authors agreed that the results 
related to the negative effect of mismatches were entirely driven by skill use.  
6 In addition to the outlined analyses, we tested the relation between education mismatches and the 
outcomes under study. Even there we do not find an association between mismatches and job satisfaction. 
Results are available upon request. 
13 
 
because the mismatch measures are not based on reliable and objective skill proficiency 
indicators. To scrutinise this finding, we repeat the analyses for young entrants to the labour 
markets only. Even then, there is no association between overskilling and job satisfaction (see 
Table A5 in Appendix A). 
We now look at the results for political efficacy, displayed in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3 about here] 
Model 1, the effective skill matching model, confirms our hypotheses 1 and 3, indicating that the 
level of required effective skill is indeed associated with political efficacy. As expected, required 
effective skill shows a positive relation with perceived political efficacy. An increase in required 
effective skill of 1 standard deviation increases the chances of belonging to the group of 
respondents who consider themselves and others efficacious on political issues with 74%. 
Regarding overperformance, our hypotheses are also supported: 1 standard deviation increase in 
overperformance increases the chances for perceived political efficacy by 20%. In line with our 
expectations, underperformance is negatively related to political efficacy.7  
The alternative skill mismatch models by Allen et al. (2013) and Pellizzari/Fichen (2013) show 
similar results, except the fact that the coefficient for underskilling is not significant in the 
Pellizzari/Fichen-model. We find that skill use, as a proxy for skills requirements in the job, has a 
strong and positive relation to perceived political efficacy in both alternative models, although it 
is a little stronger in the Allen et al. (2013) model than in the Pellizzari/Fichen (2013) model. 
Comparing the results for over- and underskilling, we find that overskilling is positively related to 
political efficacy, whereas underskilling shows a negative relation. However, we cannot compare 
the effect sizes directly, because the indicators for over- and underskilling in the alternative 
models are dummy variables, whereas the comparable indicators for the effective skill matching 
model are standardised continuous variables. If we normalise the dummy variables, we find that 
the effect sizes are smaller than for the effective skill matching model. For example, the 
normalised indicator for overskilling in the Allen et al. model has a standardised odds ratio of 
                                               
7 We use a continuous scale based on the amount of overperformance or underperformance respectively.  
Our findings are in line with Van der Velden and Verhaest (2017), showing that the first bit of skills 
shortage is positive, before the effects turn negative. However, the authors show that the negative part of 
the effect is linear. Overskilling seems to be a linear effect over the whole scale. To further check the 
relevance of the issue of non-linear effects for our analyses, we perform a robustness check, in which we 
include a quadratic term in the effective skill matching model (Model 1 in Tables 2, 3, and 4). The result of 
these additional analyses show no effects of the squared terms, no matter which dependent variable we 
use. We therefore do not look for further non-linearity. 
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1.10 whereas the variable that indicates overperformance in the effective skill matching model 
has an odds ratio of 1.20 (results available upon request). We conclude that in general, the effect 
sizes that we obtain using the effective skill matching model are quite large8. Regarding the 
likelihood ratio test, the effective skill matching model performs better than the alternative skill 
mismatch models. 
The last model (4) displays the results obtained using a subjective measure. We find no effect for 
the perception of being overskilled and a positive instead of a negative effect for subjective 
underskilling.  
[TABLE 4 about here] 
Last, we look at the results for social trust, which are displayed in Table 4. Again, we find support 
for our hypotheses 1 and 3. The effective skill matching shows a strong and positive relation 
between required effective skill as well as overperformance and social trust, and a negative 
relation with underperformance9. The model developed by Allen et al. (2013) gives similar results. 
In the model developed by Pellizzari and Fichen (2013), we only find a positive effect of 
overskilling at the 10% level, while there is no significant effect of being underskilled. Among the 
alternative skill mismatch models, the effective skill matching model shows the strongest 
likelihood ratio test. The results of model 4 based on the subjective indicator show no effect of 
mismatches. We conclude that social trust, although primarily related to proficiency and 
educational level, is also increased by the positive (and potentially empowering) experience 
caused by the utilisation of one’s skills and talent.  
5. Conclusion 
Skill mismatch is claimed to have major consequences for societies and individuals, although 
convincing evidence mainly exists for wages (e.g. OECD, 2017). However, it is not all about 
money: There are indications that workers may suffer from dissatisfaction, and that both skills 
and mismatches may affect job satisfaction but also other aspects of private and social life, as 
they are associated, for example, with ideas about one´s impact on political processes as well as 
general trust in other people. The relation between proficiency, skills and the mentioned social 
                                               
8 Regression analyses that we conducted using an ORU model for education mismatches show similar 
results, providing further support for our hypotheses. However, the negative relation with undereducation 
is clearly smaller than the negative relation with underperformance (results available upon request). 
9 The additional analyses that we perform using an ORU model for education mismatches point in the 
same direction (results available upon request). 
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outcomes is established in the literature (see e.g. McMahon, 2009). Social outcomes, such as job 
satisfaction, political efficacy, and social trust are not only important for individual well-being, 
but, in aggregate, also for the way in which labour markets and societies function. However, if 
skills are important, and returns to skills are flexible regardless of formal job requirements, then 
skill mismatch (i.e. skills shortage or surplus) must also have an effect. Investigating job 
satisfaction and other social outcomes, our article addresses a topic of public, academic and 
political concern that has been identified as missing in the discourse on skill mismatch . We 
furthermore contribute to sociological research by using and testing a new approach to measure 
skill mismatch: the ‘effective skill’ concept, developed by Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018). In 
our article, we relate this new measure to social outcomes, comparing the results with alternative 
indicators. We draw on PIAAC data, the first study to provide detailed data on workers’ actual 
skills, and skill utilisation for representative samples of the work force of a large number of 
countries. Using the unprecedented possibilities provided by these data, our analyses are based on 
objective skills measurements for representative samples of male fulltime working employees in 
22 OECD countries.  
We provide empirical evidence for two important messages, the first of which is that skill 
mismatch is not related to job satisfaction. Previous studies find negative effects of mismatches, 
and especially overeducation/overskilling, on job satisfaction. We prove that on the basis of 
objective indicators – making use of all alternative measures that we currently have – skill 
mismatch does not have an impact, as job satisfaction is in fact driven by skills utilisation. People 
feel satisfied if they do things, especially if they do things they are good at. The claim that former 
studies make regarding negative associations of skill mismatches with job satisfaction, is merely 
based on subjective assessments of the skill match. To actually measure skill mismatch, both 
detailed knowledge about a worker’s real skill proficiency and skill requirements of jobs is 
required. As this information is only provided by PIAAC for a large number of countries, 
previous studies could not assess the objective skill mismatch. Job satisfaction is a subjective 
indicator and, therefore, influenced by the subjective evaluation of one’s own situation compared 
to what a worker expected for himself compared to others. However, the correlation between 
different subjective measures, such as the subjective assessment of job satisfaction and the self-
assessment of a skill (mis-)match, is endogenous, and does not tell us much about the effect of 
real, objective over- and underskilling. Deploying unprecedented opportunities of the PIAAC 
data, we find that there is no relation between objective skill mismatch and job satisfaction, not 
even if we look at young entrants to the labour market only. The relation between skills and job 
satisfaction is driven by the use of skills: Job satisfaction is clearly not a mismatch story. 
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The second message that we provide empirical evidence for is that effective skill and skill 
mismatches are related to other social outcomes such as political efficacy and social trust. 
Controlling for the requirements of a job, a surplus in skills or effective skill is positively related 
to social outcomes. Correspondingly, skill shortages and underperformance entail penalties. 
When it comes to explaining social outcomes, our findings and the deviance tests that we 
conducted suggest that the effective skill matching model is superior to existing skill mismatch 
models. This may have to do with the underlying conceptual proximity between effective skill 
and outcomes such as political efficacy, as the idea of combining proficiency and skill use in a 
multiplicative function has a conceptual link with efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977). Furthermore, 
effective skill is related to the concept of locus of control, which may in turn be related to 
political efficacy and social trust (Judge and Bono, 2001). However, we are still very much in the 
dark about the underlying mechanism. Nevertheless, what we observe leads us to the speculation 
that high proficiency combined with high skill use may serve as empowering combination, 
creating a stronger feeling of efficacy. Task-related efficacy may potentially increase perceived 
efficacy in other domains of life (Bandura, 1977). However, we cannot test these speculations 
empirically.  
When it comes to non-employment-related social outcomes (such as political efficacy and social 
trust), applying a mismatch logic may not be too convincing at first glance. But we do find 
mismatch effects. Why this is, we do not know yet, but we consider the combination of skill 
proficiency and skill use to be an empowering combination. People who have skills and who can 
make use of skills may feel more in control and more efficacious in other domains of life too. 
Further research is necessary to examine the relation between skills, mismatches, and social 
outcomes as well as the relation with different dimensions and domains of satisfaction. Against 
the background of our findings, we are inclined to further explore the potential of PIAAC 
regarding the whole topic of social effects of skills and mismatches. We hope that the second 
cycle of the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) will widen the possibilities for in-depth 
research on the outlined topics. When it comes to explaining social outcomes, our findings clearly 
indicate that skill mismatches, and especially effective skill, are “much ado about something”. 
  
17 
 
6. References 
Allen, J. and van der Velden, R. (2001). Educational mismatches versus skill mismatches: effects 
on wages, job satisfaction, and on-the-job search, Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 434-452. 
Allen, J., Levels, M. and van der Velden, R. (2013). Skill mismatch and skill use in developed 
countries: Evidence from the PIAAC study, ROA Research Memorandum (ROA-RM-
2013/17), Maastricht: ROA. 
Allen, J. and Bijlsma, I. (2015). Skill Profiles of Occupations: Robust Multi-level Estimates Based on 
PIAAC Data, Internal Memo, Maastricht: ROA. 
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioural change, Psychological 
Review, 84(2), 191-215. 
Borgonovi, F. and Burns, T. (2015). The educational roots of 
trust, OECD Education Working Papers, No. 119, Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
Büchel, F., de Grip, A. and Mertens, A. (Eds.) (2003). Overeducation in Europe. Current Issues in 
Theory and Policy. Cheltenham, UK, Northhampton, MA: E. Elgar. 
Cedefop. (2018). Insights into skill shortages and skill mismatch. Learning from Cedefop’s European skills 
and jobs survey. Luxembourg: Publications of the European Union. 
Desjardins, R. and Schuller, T. (2006). Introduction: Understanding the Social Outcomes of 
Learning. In: Measuring the Effects of Education on Health and Civic Engagement. Proceedings of the 
Copenhagen Symposium, 1-18, Paris: OECD. 
Duncan, G.J. and Hoffman, S.D. (1981). The incidence and wage effects of overeducation, 
Economics of Education Review 1 (1), 75-86. 
European Commission. (2016). A New Skills Agenda for Europe. Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and 
Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions. 
Freeman, R. (1976). The Overeducated American. New York: Academic Press.  
Green, F. (2013). Skills and skilled work – An Economic and Social Analysis, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Green, F. and Henseke, G. (2016). Should governments of OECD countries worry about 
graduate underemployment?, ECOPOL, 32 (4), 514-537. 
18 
 
Green, F. and Zhu, Y. (2010). Overqualification, job dissatisfaction, and increasing dispersion in 
the returns to graduate education, Oxford Economic Papers, 62 (4), 740-763.  
Green, F., Felstead, A., Gallie, D. and Inanc, H. (2013). Job-Related Well-Being in Britain: First 
Findings from the Skills and Employment Survey 2012. London: Centre for Learning and Life 
Chances in Knowledge Economies and Societies, Institute of Education. 
Groot, W. and Maassen van den Brink, H. (2000). Overeducation in the labor market: a meta-
analysis, Economics of Education Review, 19(2), 149-158  
Hanushek, E.A., Schwerdt, G., Wiederhold, S. and Woessmann, L. (2015). Returns to skills 
around the world: Evidence from PIAAC, European Economic Review, 73 (2015), 103-130. 
Hanushek, E.A. and Woessmann, L. (2015). The knowledge capital of nations: Education and the 
economics of growth. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Hartog, J. (2000). Overeducation and Earnings: Where Are We, Where Should We Go?, Economics 
of Education Review, 19, 131-147. 
Heyes, J., Tomlinson, M. and Whitworth, A. (2017). Underemployment and well-being in the UK 
before and after the Great Recession, Work, employment and society, 31(1), 71-89. 
Judge, T.A and Bono, J.E. (2001). Relationship of core self-evaluations traits – self-esteem, 
generalised self-efficacy, locus of control and emotional stability – with job satisfaction 
and job performance, Journal of Applied Psychology, 86 (1), 80-92. 
McMahon, W.W. (2009). Higher Learning – Greater Good. The Private and Social Benefits of Higher 
Education, Baltimore: The Job Hopkins University Press. 
OECD. (2013). The Survey of Adult Skills: Reader’s companion. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD. (2016). Technical report of the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2nd Edition). Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
OECD. (2017). OECD Skills Outlook 2017: Skills and Global Value Chains. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
Pellizzari, M. and Fichen, A. (2013). A New Measure of Skills Mismatch, Theory and Evidence 
from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Papers, No. 153, Paris: OECD Publishing.  
Perry, A., Wiederhold, S. and Ackermann-Piek, D. (2014). How Can Skill Mismatch be 
Measured? New Approaches with PIAAC, Methods, data, analyses, 8 (2), 137-174. 
19 
 
Polachek, S. W., Pouliakas, K., Russo, G. and Tatsiramos, K. (Eds.) (2017). Skill Mismatch in Labor 
Markets, Research in Labor Economics, 45, Emerald Publishing Limited. 
Salthouse, T. (2006). Mental exercise and mental ageing: Evaluating the validity of the ‘‘use it or 
lose it’’ hypothesis, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1 (1), 68-87.  
Schleicher, A. and Thorn, W. (2016). Proposal for an extended module of non-economic outcomes in the 
second cycle of PIAAC. Internal Memo; Paris: OECD. 
Sloane, P.J. (2003). Much ado About Nothing? What does the Overeducation Literature Really 
Tell us? In: Büchel, F., de Grip, A. and Mertens, A. (Eds.): Overeducation in Europe. Current 
Issues in Theory and Policy. Cheltenham, UK, Northhampton, MA: E. Elgar, 11-48. 
Snijders, T. and Bosker, R.J. (2012). Multilevel Analysis. An Introduction to Basic and Advanced 
Multilevel Modeling. 2nd Edition. Los Angeles: Sage. 
Van der Velden, R. and Bijlsma, I. (2018). Effective skill: A new theoretical perspective on the 
relation between skills, skill use, mismatches, and wages. Oxford Economic Papers 2018, to 
appear. 
Van der Velden, R. and Verhaest, D. (2017). Are Skill Deficits always Bad? Toward a Learning 
Perspective on Skill Mismatches. In: Polachek, S. W., Pouliakas, K., Russo, G. and 
Tatsiramos, K. (Eds.) Skill Mismatch in Labor Markets, Research in Labor Economics, 
Volume 45, Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 305–343. 
Verhaest, D. and van der Velden, R. (2013). Cross-country Differences in Graduate 
Overeducation, European Sociological Review, 29 (3), 642-653. 
Verhaest, D. and Verhofstadt, E. (2016). Overeducation and job satisfaction. The role of job 
demands and control, Int J of Manpower, 37 (3), 456-47. 
Voßemer, J. and Schuck, B. (2016). Better Overeducated than Unemployed? The Short- and 
Long-Term Effects of an Overeducated Labour Market Re-entry, European Sociological 
Review, 32 (2), 251-265. 
 20 
 
7. Appendix 
 
TABLE 1 – SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVES  
 
Dependent variable Binary outcomes 
TOTAL Age groups Education level 
Freq. Percent 
Entry age 
(16-34) 
Prime age 
(35-49) 
Major age   
(50-65) 
Compulsory Secondary Tertiary Missing  
Job satisfaction    
(1) 
Satisfied (1) 25,876 79.90 8,837 9,949 7,090 3,881 15,084 6,903 8 
Not satisfied (0) 6,492 20.05 2,479 2,505 1,508 944 3,975 1,570 3 
Missing (.) 19 0.06 2 4 13 1 1 10 0 
Political Efficacy              
(2) 
Disagree (1) 17,146 52.94 6,022 6,682 4,442 1,938 9,537 5,667 4 
Agree (0) 15,096 46.61 5,232 5,735 4,129 2,841 9,465 2,784 6 
Missing (.) 145 0.45 64 41 40 47 65 32 1 
Social Trust 
(3) 
High generalized 
trust  (1) 
9,822 30.33 3,044 3,931 2,847 1,032 5,034 3,754 2 
Low generalized 
trust (0) 
22,482 69.42 8,241 8,502 5,739 3,769 13,997 4,708 8 
Missing (.) 83 0.26 33 25 25 25 36 21 1 
 
(1) Binary item that distinguishes between respondents that are 'satisfied' or 'extremely satisfied' with their current job (=1) vs. rest (=0) 
(2) Binary item that distinguishes between respondents who disagree (=1) to the statement ‘People like me don´t have any say about what the government does’ 
vs. those that agree (=0)          
(3) Dichotomised sum score over two five-level Likert items on the perception of general trustworthiness of people (sum score 6-10 (=1) vs. sum score 2-5 (=0)) 
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FIGURES 1 TO 3 — QUANTILE REGRESSION: EFFECTS OF INCREASING ONE QUINTILE IN NUMERACY SKILL OR NUMERACY USE 
 
 
Figure 1: Job satisfaction    Figure 2: Political Efficacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Social Trust 
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TABLE 2 — COMPARISON OF MISMATCH INDICATORS; DV: JOB SATISFACTION  
Odds ratios based on multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models, standard errors in parentheses; 
All continuous independent variables are standardised with std(1) and mean(0) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES 
Effective skill 
matching model 
(2018) 
Allen et al. 
(2013) 
Pellizzari & 
Fichen (2013)  
Direct self-
assessment 
     
Required effective skill (std) 1.2895*** 
   
 
(0.0476) 
   Overperformance effective skill (std) 0.9930 
   
 
(0.0220) 
   Underperformanc effective skill (std) 0.9623 
   
 
(0.0238) 
   Skill use (D. = Dummy) 
 
1.1901*** 1.1771*** 1.1746*** 
  
(0.0320) (0.0258) (0.0263) 
Overskilled (Allen et al) (D.) 
 
0.9663  
  
 
(0.0773)  
 Underskilled (Allen et al) (D.) 
 
0.8565** 
  
  
(0.0563) 
  Overskilled (Pellizzari/Fichen) (D.) 
  
0.9338 
 
   
(0.0658) 
 Underskilled (P./F.) (D.) 
  
1.1177 
 
   
(0.0757) 
 Required Education (ORU) (std) 
    
     Overeducation (ORU) (std) 
    
     Undereducation (ORU) (std) 
    
     Overskilled according to DSA (D.) 
   
0.6692*** 
    
(0.0601) 
Underskilled acc. to DSA (D.) 
   
0.7695** 
    
(0.0858) 
Mixed acc. to DSA (D.) 
   
0.8302** 
    
(0.0726) 
     Nindividuals 32,368 32,368 31,947 32,121 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 
     
Likelihood ratio test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
log likelihood -15393 -15442 -15233 -15284 
Deviance1 (Di) 30786 30884 30466 30568 
Decrease in deviance compared to 
Intercept model (D0-Di)2 
222 124 116 190 
Degrees of freedom  (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 4)  
Chi-squared value p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** 
All figures are weighted; Controls include age, age2; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
2 The decrease in deviance is computed based on the specific intercept model of each mismatch-approach 
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TABLE 3 — COMPARISON OF MISMATCH INDICATORS; DV: POLITICAL EFFICACY  
Odds ratios based on multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models, standard errors in parentheses; 
All continuous independent variables are standardised with std(1) and mean(0) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES 
Effective skill 
matching 
model (2018) 
Allen et al. 
(2013) 
Pellizzari & 
Fichen (2013)  
Direct self-
assessment 
     
Required effective skill (std) 1.7373*** 
   
 
(0.0682) 
   Overperformance effective skill (std) 1.2023*** 
   
 
(0.0232) 
   Underperformance effective skill (std) 0.8246*** 
   
 
(0.0172) 
   Skill use (D. = Dummy) 
 
1.5077*** 1.3949*** 1.3883*** 
  
(0.0435) (0.0324) (0.0292) 
Overskilled (Allen et al) (D.) 
 
1.4533*** 
   
 
(0.1251) 
  Underskilled (Allen et al) (D.) 
 
0.5807*** 
  
  
(0.0388) 
  Overskilled (Pellizzari/Fichen) (D.) 
  
1.2096*** 
 
   
(0.0777) 
 Underskilled (P./F.) (D.) 
  
0.9191 
 
   
(0.0632) 
 Required Education (ORU) (std) 
    
     Overeducation (ORU) (std) 
    
     Undereducation (ORU) (std) 
    
     Overskilled according to DSA (D.) 
   
1.0759 
    
(0.0635) 
Underskilled acc. to DSA (D.) 
   
1.2263*** 
    
(0.0819) 
Mixed acc. to DSA (D.) 
   
1.2585*** 
    
(0.1092) 
 
Nindividuals 32,242 32,242 31,823 32,003 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 
     
Likelihood ratio test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
log likelihood -20381 -20549 -20361 -20467 
Deviance1 (Di) 40762 41098 40722 40934 
Decrease in deviance compared to 
Intercept model (D0-Di)2 
1286 950 778 792 
Degrees of freedom  (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 4)  
Chi-squared value p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** 
All figures are weighted; Controls include age, age2; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
2 The decrease in deviance is computed based on the specific intercept model of each mismatch-approach 
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TABLE 4 — COMPARISON OF MISMATCH INDICATORS; DV: SOCIAL TRUST  
Odds ratios based on multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models, standard errors in parentheses; 
All continuous independent variables are standardised with std(1) and mean(0)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES 
Effective skill 
matching 
model (2018) 
Allen et al. 
(2013) 
Pellizzari & 
Fichen (2013)  
Direct self-
assessment 
     
Required effective skill (std) 1.7057*** 
   
 
(0.0713) 
   Overperformance effective skill (std) 1.1445*** 
   
 
(0.0208) 
   Underperformance effective skill (std) 0.8642*** 
   
 
(0.0193) 
   Skill use (D. = Dummy) 
 
1.4290*** 1.3243*** 1.3243*** 
  
(0.0422) (0.0324) (0.0327) 
Overskilled (Allen et al) (D.) 
 
1.6063***  
  
 
(0.1362)  
 Underskilled (Allen et al) (D.) 
 
0.6160*** 
  
  
(0.0408) 
  Overskilled (Pellizzari/Fichen) (D.) 
  
1.1393* 
 
   
(0.0775) 
 Underskilled (P./F.) (D.) 
  
1.0068 
 
   
(0.0513) 
 Required Education (ORU) (std) 
    
     Overeducation (ORU) (std) 
    
     Undereducation (ORU) (std) 
    
     Overskilled according to DSA (D.) 
   
0.9071 
    
(0.0618) 
Underskilled acc. to DSA (D.) 
   
0.9999 
    
(0.0900) 
Mixed acc. to DSA (D.) 
   
0.9841 
    
(0.0661) 
     Nindividuals 32,304 32,304 31,885 32,058 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 
     
Likelihood ratio test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
log likelihood -17584 -17786 -17663 -17695 
Deviance1 (Di) 35168 35572 35326 35390 
Decrease in deviance compared to 
Intercept model (D0-Di)2 
1010 606 456 454 
Degrees of freedom  (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 4)  
Chi-squared value p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** 
All figures are weighted; Controls include age, age2; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
2 The decrease in deviance is computed based on the specific intercept model of each mismatch-approach 
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Appendix A (Supplemental Material): Robustness checks and additional analyses 
TABLE A1 — EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF SKILL PROFICIENCY, SKILL USE, AND EFFECTIVE SKILL; MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LOGIT MODELS 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable Job Satisfaction Political Efficacy Social Trust 
      
 
     
Skill Proficiency 1.0138 0.5423*** 1.3341*** 0.8754 1.3730*** 0.8139 
  (0.0302) (0.0793) (0.0365) (0.1916) (0.0452) (0.1239) 
Skill Use 1.1721*** 0.6153*** 1.2627*** 0.8193 1.1840*** 0.6931** 
  (0.0210) (0.0863) (0.0244) (0.1782) (0.0233) (0.1019) 
Skill Proficiency * Skill Use   1.0661***  1.0438**  1.0542*** 
(= Effective skill)  (0.0149)  (0.0224)  (0.0151) 
    
  
  
Observations 32,368 32,368 32,242 32,242 32,304 32,304 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Odd ratios and standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2; All figures are weighted 
 
  
    
Likelihood ratio test Job Satisfaction Political Efficacy Social Trust 
log likelihood -15445 -15437 -20448 -20443 -17679 -17673 
Deviance1 (Di) 30890 30874 40896 40886 35358 35346 
Decrease in deviance  
between nested models 
 DM7-DM8 
 
DM1-DM2 
 
DM5-DM6 
 16 
 
10 
 
12 
Chi-squared value of decrease (Nested models) 
 
p < 0.005 *** 
 
p < 0.01 *** 
 
p < 0.01 *** 
Degrees of freedom  df = 3 
 
df = 3 
 
df = 3 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
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TABLE A2 — EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF SKILL PROFICIENCY, SKILL USE, AND EFFECTIVE SKILL – ROBUSTNESS CHECK USING THE LITERACY DOMAIN 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
VARIABLES Int. Model 
Job Satis-
faction 
Job Satis-
faction 
Int. Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. Model 
Social 
Trust 
Social 
Trust 
Skill Proficiency 
 
1.0012 0.5563*** 
 
1.2469*** 0.5937*** 
 
1.2671*** 0.7126** 
  
 
(0.0156) (0.0879) 
 
(0.0209) (0.0935) 
 
(0.0318) (0.1095) 
Skill Use 
 
1.2556*** 0.7019** 
 
1.2532*** 0.6051*** 
 
1.2127*** 0.6882** 
  
 
(0.0241) (0.1075) 
 
(0.0325) (0.0889) 
 
(0.0195) (0.1045) 
Skill Proficiency * Skill Use  
  
1.0619*** 
  
1.0780*** 
  
1.0595*** 
(= Effective skill) 
  
(0.0164) 
  
(0.0170) 
  
(0.0159) 
Observations 32,368 32,368 32,368 32,242 32,242 32,242 32,304 32,304 32,304 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Odd ratios and standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2; All figures are weighted 
          
Likelihood ratio test Int. Model 
Job Satis-
faction 
Job Satis-
faction 
Int. Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. Model 
Social 
Trust 
Social 
Trust 
log likelihood -15504 -15387 -15370 -21024 -20406 -20370 -18089 -17612 -17595 
Deviance1 (Di) 31008 30774 30740 42048 40812 40740 36178 35224 35190 
Decrease in deviance (D0-Di)  
compared to Intercept model   
234 268 
 
1236 1308 
 
954 988 
Degrees of freedom 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
Chi-squared value of decrease compared to Intercept 
model 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
Additional decrease in deviance (Nested models)   
DM2-DM1 
  
DM6-DM5 
  
DM10-DM9 
  
34 
  
72 
  
34 
Chi-squared value of decrease (Nested models) 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
Degrees of freedom     df = 3     df = 3     df = 3 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
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TABLE A3 — EFFECTIVE SKILL MATCHING MODEL – ROBUSTNESS CHECK USING THE LITERACY DOMAIN 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 12 
VARIABLES 
Int. 
Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. 
Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. 
Model 
Social 
Trust 
Required effective skill (literacy) 
 
1.3460*** 
 
1.6864*** 
 
1.7700*** 
  
 
(0.0443) 
 
(0.0626) 
 
(0.0754) 
Overperformance effective skill (literacy) 
 
0.9765 
 
1.9440*** 
 
1.9189*** 
  
 
(0.0896) 
 
(0.1431) 
 
(0.1517) 
Underperformance effective skill (literacy) 
 
1.0700 
 
0.6689*** 
 
0.7548*** 
  
 
(0.0731) 
 
(0.0473) 
 
(0.0515) 
Observations 32,368 32,361 32,242 32,236 32,304 32,297 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Odd ratios and standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2; All figures are weighted 
 
Likelihood ratio test 
Int. 
Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. 
Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. 
Model 
Social 
Trust 
log likelihood -15504 -15379 -21024 -20336 -18089 -17464 
Deviance1 (Di) 31008 30758 42048 40672 36178 34928 
Decrease in deviance (D0-Di) compared to Intercept model  
 
250 
 
1376 
 
1250 
Degrees of freedom 
 
df = 3 
 
df = 3 
 
df = 3 
Chi-squared value of decrease compared to Intercept model   
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
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TABLE A4A-C - EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF SKILL PROFICIENCY, SKILL USE, AND EFFECTIVE SKILL - ROBUSTNESS CHECK: SEPARATE PVS 
 
TABLE A4a: Using PVNUM2 only   
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
VARIABLES 
Int. 
Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. 
Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. 
Model 
Social 
Trust 
Social 
Trust 
Skill Proficiency (PVNUM2) 
 
1.0184 0.5631*** 
 
1.2836*** 0.9135 
 
1.2985*** 0.8259 
  
 
(0.0261) (0.0859) 
 
(0.0306) (0.1936) 
 
(0.0377) (0.1407) 
Skill Use (PVNUM2) 
 
1.1701*** 0.6364*** 
 
1.2815*** 0.9047 
 
1.2084*** 0.7615 
  
 
(0.0203) (0.0939) 
 
(0.0256) (0.1923) 
 
(0.0267) (0.1289) 
Skill Proficiency * Skill Use  
  
1.0624*** 
  
1.0352* 
  
1.0466*** 
(= Effective skill) 
  
(0.0156) 
  
(0.0217) 
  
(0.0166) 
Observations 32,368 32,368 32,368 32,242 32,242 32,242 32,304 32,304 32,304 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Odd ratios and standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  Controls include age, age2; All figures are weighted  
  
         
Likelihood ratio test 
Int. 
Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. 
Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. 
Model 
Social 
Trust 
Social 
Trust 
log likelihood -15504 -15445 -15437 -21024 -20471 -20467 -18089 -17715 -17710 
Deviance1 (Di) 31008 30890 30874 42048 40942 40934 36178 35430 35420 
Decrease in deviance (D0-Di) compared to Intercept model  
 
118 134 
 
1106 1114 
 
748 758 
Degrees of freedom 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
Chi-squared value of decrease compared to Intercept model   
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 
0.005 
***   
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
Additional decrease in deviance (Nested models)   
DM2-DM1 
  
DM6-DM5 
  
DM10-DM9 
  
16 
  
8 
  
10 
Chi-squared value of decrease (Nested models) 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.05 
** 
  
p < 0.025 
** 
Degrees of freedom     df = 3     df = 3     df = 3 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff 
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TABLE A4b: Using PVNUM7 only   
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
VARIABLES 
Int. 
Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. 
Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. 
Model 
Social 
Trust 
Social 
Trust 
Skill Proficiency (PVNUM2) 
 
1.0164 0.4648*** 
 
1.2697*** 0.8981 
 
1.3103*** 0.9097 
  
 
(0.0255) (0.0782) 
 
(0.0310) (0.1725) 
 
(0.0346) (0.1268) 
Skill Use (PVNUM2) 
 
1.1710*** 0.5237*** 
 
1.2859*** 0.9019 
 
1.2044*** 0.8298 
  
 
(0.0228) (0.0866) 
 
(0.0265) (0.1729) 
 
(0.0241) (0.1152) 
Skill Proficiency * Skill Use  
  
1.0832*** 
  
1.0358* 
  
1.0374*** 
(= Effective skill) 
  
(0.0176) 
  
(0.0196) 
  
(0.0141) 
Observations 32,368 32,368 32,368 32,242 32,242 32,242 32,304 32,304 32,304 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Odd ratios and standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  Controls include age, age2; All figures are weighted  
          
Likelihood ratio test 
Int. 
Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. 
Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. 
Model 
Social 
Trust 
Social 
Trust 
log likelihood -15504 -15445 -15431 -21024 -20486 -20483 -18089 -17705 -17702 
Deviance1 (Di) 31008 30890 30862 42048 40972 40966 36178 35410 35404 
Decrease in deviance (D0-Di) compared to Intercept model  
 
118 146 
 
1076 1082 
 
768 774 
Degrees of freedom 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
Chi-squared value of decrease compared to Intercept model   
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 
0.005 
***   
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
Additional decrease in deviance (Nested models)   
DM2-DM1 
  
DM6-DM5 
  
DM10-DM9 
  
28 
  
6 
  
6 
Chi-squared value of decrease (Nested models) 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.9 
  
p < 0.9 
Degrees of freedom     df = 3     df = 3     df = 3 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
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TABLE A4c: Using PVNUM10 only  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
VARIABLES Int. Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. Model Social Trust Social Trust 
Skill Proficiency (PVNUM2) 
 
1.0081 0.5422*** 
 
1.2733*** 0.9601 
 
1.3179*** 0.8931 
  
 
(0.0272) (0.0731) 
 
(0.0306) (0.2032) 
 
(0.0378) (0.1218) 
Skill Use (PVNUM2) 
 
1.1746*** 0.6222*** 
 
1.2846*** 0.9625 
 
1.2019*** 0.8086 
  
 
(0.0228) (0.0825) 
 
(0.0255) (0.2023) 
 
(0.0253) (0.1065) 
Skill Proficiency * Skill Use  
  
1.0652*** 
  
1.0291 
  
1.0399*** 
(= Effective skill) 
  
(0.0137) 
  
(0.0213) 
  
(0.0135) 
Observations 32,368 32,368 32,368 32,242 32,242 32,242 32,304 32,304 32,304 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Odd ratios and standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2; All figures are weighted 
  
Likelihood ratio test Int. Model 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Job 
Satisfaction 
Int. Model 
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Efficacy 
Int. Model Social Trust Social Trust 
log likelihood -15504 -15445 -15436 -21024 -20482 -20479 -18089 -17698 -17694 
Deviance1 (Di) 31008 30890 30872 42048 40964 40958 36178 35396 35388 
Decrease in deviance (D0-Di) 
compared to Intercept model   
118 136 
 
1084 1090 
 
782 790 
Degrees of freedom 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
 
df = 2 df = 3 
Chi-squared value of decrease 
compared to Intercept model 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.005 
*** 
p < 0.005 
*** 
Additional decrease in deviance 
(Nested models) 
  
DM2-DM1 
  
DM6-DM5 
  
DM10-DM9 
  
18 
  
6 
  
8 
Chi-squared value of decrease 
(Nested models)   
p < 0.005 
*** 
  
p < 0.9  
  
p < 0.05 ** 
Degrees of freedom     df = 3     df = 3     df = 3 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
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TABLE A5 — COMPARISON OF MISMATCH INDICATORS; DV: JOB SATISFACTION 
SAMPLE: ENTRY AGE MALE FULLTIME EMPLOYEES 
Odds ratios based on multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models, standard errors in parentheses; 
All continuous independent variables are standardised with std(1) and mean(0)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES 
Effective skill 
matching 
model (2018) 
Allen et al. 
(2013) 
Pellizzari & 
Fichen (2013)  
Direct self-
assessment 
     
Required effective skill (std) 1.2596***    
 
(0.0551)    
Overperformance effective skill (std) 0.9571    
 
(0.0262)    
Underperformance effective skill (std) 0.9384*    
 
(0.0342)    
Skill use (D. = Dummy)  1.1551*** 1.1572*** 1.1474*** 
 
 (0.0400) (0.0373) (0.0394) 
Overskilled (Allen et al) (D.)  0.8674   
 
 (0.1127)   
Underskilled (Allen et al) (D.)  0.8463   
 
 (0.1190)   
Overskilled (Pellizzari/Fichen) (D.)   0.8767  
 
  (0.0786)  
Underskilled (P./F.) (D.)   0.8092  
 
  (0.1108)  
Required Education (ORU) (std)     
 
    
Overeducation (ORU) (std)     
 
    
Undereducation (ORU) (std)     
 
    
Overskilled according to DSA (D.)    0.4652*** 
 
   (0.0839) 
Underskilled acc. to DSA (D.)    0.5533*** 
 
   (0.1214) 
Mixed acc. to DSA (D.)    0.6249** 
 
   (0.1174) 
Nindividuals 11,316 11,316 11,189 11,248 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 
     
Likelihood ratio test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
log likelihood -5523 -5537 -5477 -5480 
Deviance1 (Di) 11046 11074 10954 10960 
Decrease in deviance compared to 
Intercept model (D0-Di)2 
60 32 32 80 
Degrees of freedom  (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 3)   (df = 4)  
Chi-squared value p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** p<0.005*** 
All figures are weighted; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Deviance = -2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker, 2012: 97ff. 
2 The decrease in deviance is computed based on the specific intercept model of each mismatch-approach 
